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Abstract:  Innovative  services  have  exploited  data  about  users’  physical  location, 
sometimes  but  not always explicitly  with their consent.  As  new applications that 
reveal users’ location data appear on the Web it essential to focus on the privacy 
implications,  in  particular  with  respect  to  inferences  about  context.  This  paper 
focuses on the  understanding of location and contextual  privacy by developing a 
framework for analysis, which is applied to existing systems that exploit location 
data.  The  analysis  highlights  the  primal  role  of  location  in  linking  and  inferring 
contextual data, but also how these inferences can extend to non-contextual data. 
Introduction 
The exposure of location data in Web applications is an emerging issue, as innovative 
services  appear  which  take  users’  location  from  sensors  on  increasingly  popular 
devices as input. Social networking sites such as Facebook or Foursquare have been 
particularly important in hosting services that add value to their social networks. 
However, to provide these services service providers have to harvest location data, 
which  raises  the  question  of  privacy.  Location  is  a  powerful  dimension  for 
understanding a person’s life, both in terms of patterns of behaviour, and in terms of 
what  extra  contextual  or  even  non-contextual  data  may  be  inferred  by  these 
applications. Location privacy is a matter not only for location data, but also other 
types of data such as temporal and activity data that may be inferred from the location 
data. 
Location privacy has a number of aspects that mark it out from other types of digital 
privacy issues:  
  Contextual data inferred through location can support surveillance techniques 
such as tracking the traces of individuals, their activities and so on. This is 
very powerful for building psychological and behavioural profiles.  
  Location data deals with an individual’s real-time location (or, rather, the real-
time  location  of  an  individual’s  device).  The  individual  is  very  expressly 
targeted. 
  Location  data  are  not  valuable  for  the  data  subject  to  build  a  persona.  In 
general, location is published for purpose-driven reasons, and its contribution 
to informational self-determination is relatively small. 
Given these issues, it is essential to shed light on the various effects on privacy which 
are caused by location data. To that end, this paper provides a framework for analysis Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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for  location  data,  to  provide  a  route  to  understanding  the  potential  privacy 
implications that may arise from their exposure. The framework is tested on a sample 
of recent systems taken from the research literature. 
Data properties 
We need to take into account those properties that can highlight the implications of 
exposing  location  and  contextual  information,  determining  which  information  is 
particularly rich in identification and profiling possibilities. An initial set of properties 
was  defined  based  on  background  literature  and  later  refined  with  a  small  set  of 
research  papers  retrieved  from  the  Proceedings  of  the  Mobile  HCI  conferences. 
Broadly speaking, it is relevant to determine not only what data are being harvested, 
but also how they are used, who has access, and so on. 
Data degree 
Location and contextual data can be classified into different degrees of data based on 
the complexity of the inference that produced them. 
  1st Degree. Data that are explicitly provided. For instance, a smartphone will 
explicitly declare its user’s geographical location. 
  2nd Degree. Data that are inferred directly, such as co-location between two 
users.  
  3rd Degree.  Data that require inference with complex heuristics. This may 
require retrieval of data from a range of users.  
Of course, there will be borderline  cases, and  a different  characterisation may  be 
useful. Our aim is to provide a simple measure of the intuitiveness of inferred data. 
The different degrees can be illustrated via the following scenario. 
Alice  is  a  regular  smartphone  user  and  allows  her  phone  to  update  her  location 
information through a location-based application. Mary, a friend of Alice, has the 
same functionality set in her own smartphone.  
A  third  party  collects  and  stores  the  tracks  of  users  of  this  specific  app,  and  is 
therefore aware of the movements of Alice and Mary. The app also identifies and 
calculates the number of co-locations between the users. If the number of co-locations 
between any two users is significant, it infers that they are socially related. Alice and 
Mary are often in the same location, and a connection is inferred. Furthermore, via 
analysis of the locations of a large number of people, the app can determine certain 
geographical ‘hotspots’ where many congregate, and which might be of interest to 
Alice and Mary. 
These  contextual  elements  can  be  classified  into  different  degrees  based  on  their 
inferential complexity. Location information is explicitly declared and is consequently 
of first degree. Data inferred from location data (of one or a small number of users), 
such as activity and co-location, are second degree. The third degree makes use of 
even more complex heuristics, such as combining Alice’s data with the data from 
thousands of other users, in this case to identify geographical hotspots. Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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Personally identifiable data 
Personally  identifiable  information  (PII)  includes  any  piece  of  data  that  identifies 
uniquely a particular person (given the caveat that the location data we discuss here 
relates strictly to a device rather than a person). Location data can potentially be PII, 
especially in combination with other information. A simple example could be the 
identification that a specific GPS coordinate is a person’s current location. 
  Directly  Identifiable  Data.  An  individual  is  explicitly  related  to  a  piece  of 
information.  
  Indirectly Identifiable Data. It can be inferred that an individual is related to a 
piece of information.  
  Heuristically  Identifiable  Data.  It  can  heuristically  be  inferred  with  some 
probability that an individual is related to a piece of information.  
  Non Identifiable Data. A piece of information is not related to any individual.  
User consent 
This  property  concerns  whether  the  individual  is  asked  to  provide  consent  before 
location data is retrieved or published. User consent may be given not only explicitly 
but also implicitly, in cases where the user is not directly asked to give out their data, 
but the data are published with their full knowledge and the user does not take any 
action against it. User consent is only legally required for data that are PII. 
Data quality 
The better the quality of data, the more accurate the inferences made upon it will be, 
all things being equal, and therefore the greater the threat to privacy. The quality of 
the data can be expressed based on a set of three different characteristics; accuracy, 
completeness and timeliness:  
  Accurate Data. The data is precise.  
  Complete Data. The data is complete in the sense that are no values missing 
from it or there is nothing to be added to it.  
  Timely Data. The data is current and not out-of-date.  
Data access 
It is important to ask not only what data are being gathered, but who can use it? As 
shown in Figure 1 there are a number of different entities that may have access to the 
data.  In  addition  to  this,  they  might  have  different  types  of  access 
(read/edit/disseminate). We assume that the system has always access to the data. The 
sample is adequately described by a hierarchy, as shown in the figure, but of course it 
may be that a more complex structure is appropriate for a wider sample (e.g. a system 
might give access to the data to itself and third party systems, but not to the user or his 
or her contacts). Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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Figure 1: Who has access to data? 
Data source 
Data can come from different sources, not only the user. Inferences can be made from 
data provided by the system, or by contacts of the user and 3rd parties. 
A sample of location-based systems 
In order to assess the trends in location privacy, the systems presented in three years 
(2008,  2009,  2010)  of  the  Ubiquitous  Computing  and  Mobile  Human  Computer 
Interaction conferences were analysed; these conferences are the premier gatherings 
for ubiquitous computing, and so it was assumed that they would be ‘ahead of the 
curve’ and good predictors of trends. 
Initially, any systems that made use of location data were selected. The selection was 
narrowed according to the following criteria. 
  The paper contains a commercial or research system.  
  The paper focuses on location and contextual data.  
  The data are retrieved from real usage of the system (either in the context of an 
experiment or actual usage).  
  The retrieved data refer to people.  
  Only full and short papers are included in the analysis.  
The result was a sample of systems described in 30 papers. Space precludes a full 
listing, but see the Appendix for an abbreviated list. 
After selecting the systems to be included, the exposed location and contextual data in 
each system were identified. A category of data was selected for further analysis if it 
had either of the following characteristics:  
  Explicitly discussed location information  
  Explicitly discussed contextual information  Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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Only data that were explicitly discussed in a paper were included in the analysis. Data 
that were not explicitly discussed, but might be inferred from the discussed, were not 
included. 
Analysis of the sample 
After the selection of data categories in all the selected papers, each category was 
analysed in terms the properties set out above. The analysis of the sample gives some 
indication of how the data used by the services described in the papers might impinge 
upon privacy. 
The first question deals with the types of systems that make use of location data. As 
shown in Figure 2, the range is quite wide.  
 
Figure 2: Types of system identified in the analysis 
Half of the systems do make complex heuristic inferences of the 3
rd degree (15 out of 
30), as shown in Figure 3. We can go further  and identify systems that make 3
rd 
degree  inferences  where  the  inferred  data  go  beyond  the  context  of  the  person’s 
location, i.e. where the inferred data have no semantic relation with the 1
st degree 
location data. Out of 15 systems that make 3rd degree inferences, 5 use location data 
to make inferences beyond location.  Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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Figure 3: Systems that make 3rd degree inferences 
The different properties can be profitably investigated along the dimension of the 
degree of inference. For each of the relevant properties, the sample was analysed to 
see whether the systems treated inferred data differently from data presented to the 
system. 
Personal Identifiable Data. Regardless of the level of inference the majority of the 
data  was  directly  personal  identifiable  (Table  1).  That  means  that  most  of  the 
information could easily be associated with a specific individual.  
  1
st Degree  2
nd Degree  3
rd Degree 
Directly  67%  56%  43% 
Indirectly  11%  12%  7% 
Heuristically  3%  6%  4% 
Non Identifiable  18%  24%  39% 
Table 1: Degree-based analysis of personally identifiable data 
User  Consent.  With  regards  to  1
st  degree  data  most  systems  expected  users 
themselves to expose their data (e.g. user location), so it was taken for granted that the 
user consent was given. However, when it came to 2nd and 3rd degree data there was 
not sufficient information to suggest that the consent of the user was requested (Table 
2). 
  1
st Degree  2
nd Degree  3
rd Degree 
Explicit  69%  21%  18% 
Implicit  15%  21%  18% 
No Information  16%  44%  39% 
Table 2: Degree-based analysis of user consent 
Data Quality. Most of the systems were provided with high quality 1
st degree data in 
terms of completeness, timeliness and accuracy. However, there was relatively little 
information with regards to the quality of 2nd and 3rd degree data (Table 3).  Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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  1
st Degree  2
nd Degree  3
rd Degree 
Good  Quality(Accurate/ 
Complete/ Timely) 
55%  18%  7% 
Low Quality  9%  24%  43% 
No Information  36%  59%  50% 
Table 3: Degree-based analysis of data quality 
Data Access. As Table 4 shows, regardless the degree of the data the majority of the 
data in these systems were available to the user who they refer to. Nevertheless, in 
most cases  the access  rights  of the user were not  clear in  the papers.  It is  worth 
pointing out that in most of these systems there was little clear indication about 3
rd 
party systems involved. 
  System  System + 
User 
System + 
User + User 
Contacts 
Everyone  Unknown 
1
st Degree  4%  63%  22%  5%  6% 
2
nd Degree  15%  67%      18% 
3
rd Degree  36%  46%      18% 
Table 4: Degree-based analysis of data access 
Data Source. As expected the 1
st degree data were mostly user-generated, whereas 
the 2
nd and 3
rd degree data were generated by the system (Table 5).  
  System  User  Unknown 
1
st Degree  47%  53%   
2
nd Degree  79%  21%   
3
rd Degree  93%  3%  4% 
Table 5: Degree-based analysis of data source 
The analysis also focused on the relation between location and the type of data that 
systems publish. As shown in Figure 4, in more than half of the systems location 
plays a primary role on the type of data that are published about a user. 27% of the 
systems are affected by location data but not primarily, whereas 17% of the systems 
use location data only as metadata.  Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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Figure 4: The role of location in the sample 
Discussion 
These results highlight the power of location data as a starting point for aggregating 
and  inferring  data.  For  instance,  one  third  of  the  inferred  data  have  no  semantic 
relation to location data – they are inferences about some totally new aspect of the 
users’ behaviour. Figure 4 confirms the role of location data as a catalyst for linking 
data across the Web.  
As the results revealed, the majority of the data in the analysed systems could be 
characterised as PII. Although in the majority of the systems the 1
st degree data were 
exposed with the individual’s explicit consent, there was not sufficient information to 
suggest that the consent of the users was requested before making 2
nd and 3
rd degree 
inferences on their data. This may of course not be sinister in many cases, but only a 
minority of the systems are explicitly concerned with privacy, and contain privacy-
protecting mechanisms. As we move out from 1
st degree data, the user may be losing 
control in at least some cases. 
It has long been understood that exposing location data online can present a number 
of privacy-related risks, but the framework for analysis given above allows a more 
targeted exploration of the relations between the complex issues of consent, inference 
and access. Who can see the data? How is it used? Where is it from? Answers to these 
questions will strongly affect the assessment and management of risk. 
It is worth pointing out that the majority of these systems were research systems and 
not  commercial.  The  data  were  collected  in  many  cases  in  the  context  of  an 
experiment instead of real usage of the systems. In addition, in many cases there was 
not sufficient indication of data quality, user consent or even whether the system took 
any actions to  anonymise the collected data. Nevertheless, silence on these topics 
implies that the imperative to build a functioning system outweighs the methodology 
of privacy by design. 
The work reported in this brief paper is intended to show that location privacy is not a 
homogeneous phenomenon. Location data can be used in more or less sophisticated 
ways,  and  affects  privacy  (and  the  awareness  of  privacy  breaches)  differently 
depending on how it is acquired, who has access to it, and so on. The small sample 
shows that many systems treat data differently depending on how it was acquired. The 
growing  popularity  of  location-based  services  shows  the  need  for  comprehensive Zafeiropoulou et al, Location Data and Privacy 
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analysis and description of data usage patterns. We do not claim that the framework 
presented in this paper is definitive, or provides all the relevant categories; however, it 
does indicate that a simple set of categories, or crude mechanisms such as consent 
tickboxes,  are  unlikely  to  allow  users  to  manage  their  privacy  and  consent  in  a 
nuanced and sensitive manner. 
Appendix: the papers used in the sample 
From MobileHCI ’08: 
Bamford et al 
Clawson et al 
Froelich et al 
Hang et al 
Herbst et al 
Hutter et al 
Melto et al 
Preuveneers et al 
Robinson et al 
Yoon et al 
You et al 
From MobileHCI ’09: 
Ankolekar et al 
Cherubini et al 
Harper & Taylor 
Robinson et al 
Von  Watzdorf  & 
Michahelles 
From MobileHCI ’10: 
Brush et al 
Cui et al 
Sohn et al 
Wagner et al 
From UbiComp ‘08 
Stewart et al 
Zheng et al 
From UbiComp ‘09 
Lim & Dey 
From UbiComp ‘10 
Cranshaw et al 
Dearman et al 
Lin et al 
Lovett et al 
Madan et al 
Tang et al 
Toch et al 
 